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DEFINING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE: ARE
GOVERNMENT PREFERENTIAL BUSINESS CERTIFICATION
PROGRAMS NARROWLY TAILORED?
George R. La Noue*
ABSTRACT
The passage of the Public Works Employment Act (“PWEA”)
of 1976 which set aside ten percent of all procurement dollars awarded
under it for “minority owned businesses” began a precedent of the use
of contracting preferences for these firms in various federal programs.
Later, many of these procurement programs were expanded to include
women-owned businesses as beneficiaries. Soon such programs were
initiated by state and local governments across the country.
Race and gender preferential contracting programs have always
had an uneasy relationship with equal protection principles. Although
the PWEA survived a United States Supreme Court decision in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, in two later landmark decisions, City of Richmond v. Croson and Adarand v. Pena, the Court determined that strict
scrutiny would be the standard of review for race-based programs.
Specifically, such programs would need to have a compelling interest
and be narrowly tailored to survive. Since then, lower courts have
made several dozen decisions applying these standards. Courts have
heavily criticized some of these programs for not having a compelling
interest, but more often where preferential programs have been terminated or altered, it has been because they have not been narrowly tailored. The most common programmatic defect has been including
groups without evidence of discrimination against them.
There is another narrow tailoring problem courts have not addressed. Almost all preferential contracting programs require as a condition of participation that individual firm owners seek certification as
a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) for federal procurement
or Minority and Women-Owned Business Enterprise (“MWBE”) for
state and local procurement. Without such certification, a business
* George R. La Noue is Professor of Political Science, Professor of Public
Policy, and Director of the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts at the University of Maryland Baltimore County (Hanover College B.A. 1959, Yale University, M.A. 1962, Ph.D. 1966). I am indebted to Theo Ogune, Esq. and John Sullivan,
Esq. for their research assistance. The conclusions and recommendations are the sole
responsibility of the Author.
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cannot receive a preferential contract or be counted in meeting a goal.
The certification process to determine social and economic disadvantage are remarkably uniform across agencies and levels of government.
Three characteristics of the certification process raise narrow
tailoring problems. First, the social disadvantage affidavit requires only that the owner affirm that he or she has been “subjected to racial or
ethnic prejudice or cultural bias.” These phrases do not properly distinguish between remediable discrimination and societal discrimination, which the Supreme Court has found is not a basis for a narrow
tailored remedy.
Second, there is evidence that while the process for challenging the rebuttable presumption of social disadvantage exists, the criteria for establishing that an owner, identified as a member of a designated group,
now has sufficient achievement and social standing to be no longer socially disadvantaged does not exist. Thus, social disadvantage is as a
practical matter established at birth and cannot be challenged by evidence of a successful life.
Third, the economic disadvantage affidavit requires that an
owner attest that “my ability to compete in the free enterprise system
has been impaired due to diminished capital or credit opportunities
compared to other businesses in the same or similar lines of business
who are not socially or economically disadvantaged.” This attestation
requires the owner to have accurate information about the capital and
credit opportunities of the other businesses. The diminished status has
no time or place limitations. The certification process requires no actual information about the applicant’s credit or borrowing history.
This Article examines the legal framework for the certification
process as well as two different sources of empirical evidence. A number of disparity studies around the nation have asked minority and
women business owners whether they have suffered from businessrelated discrimination. Most owners, in fact, do not claim they have
suffered from discrimination. The second source of empirical evidence
is from a telephone survey where certified Maryland MWBEs were
asked what they thought the concept of social disadvantage meant and
to describe the incidents of discrimination that had affected them.
Overwhelmingly, these results show that owner understandings of disadvantage and discrimination are inconsistent with the requirement to
identify relevant discrimination outlined in Croson. The Article then
concludes by suggesting some modifications in the certification process to make it narrowly tailored.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When governments use racial, ethnic, or gender classifications
to influence the award of public contracts, which firm owners are entitled to those benefits? Almost everywhere, the answer is firms whose
owners meet the criteria for certification as Disadvantaged Business
Enterprises (“DBEs”) in federal programs administered by the Small
Business Administration (“SBA”), the United States Department of
Transportation (“USDOT”), the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), and other federal agencies or Minority and Women-Owned
Business Enterprises (“MWBEs”) in state and local programs. Certification is the key to the benefits. When a racial classification is involved, the Supreme Court has held that the standard of review is strict
scrutiny, which requires the existence of a compelling interest and a
use of race that is narrowly tailored.1 Whether the certification process
and criteria are narrowly tailored is the subject of this Article.
In Part I, the Author first briefly reviews characteristics of DBE and
MWBE programs and the controversies about them. Part II portrays
the historical context of preferential contracting programs. Part III examines the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test courts have
developed to evaluate these programs. In Part IV, the Author describes
the certification process and criteria for determining economic and social disadvantage. The social disadvantage presumption in the certification process is then compared to evidence from several disparity
studies in Part V, and to a small sample of Maryland-certified MWBEs
in Part VI. Finally, Part VII explores some suggestions for modifying
the certification process.
Currently there are about 1,425 state and local recipients of
federal transportation funds, all of whom must set DBE goals on the
federally subsidized contract they administer.2 About 27,000 firms are
certified as DBEs,3 and there are also about 8,440 8(a) certified firms4
1

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality opinion).
2
Email from Leonardo San Román, Spec. Assistant to the Dir., Off. of Small
& Disadvantage Bus. Utilization, to John Sullivan, Assoc. Director, Project on Civil
Rights & Public Contracts (Sept. 27, 2011) (on file with author).
3
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-78, DISADVANTAGED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAMS: ASSESSING USE OF PROXY DATA WOULD
ENHANCE ABILITY TO KNOW IF STATES ARE MEETING THEIR GOALS 8 (2011).
4
The Small Business Administration allows small businesses that are owned
and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual to apply for
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eligible for federal prime contracts set aside for them.5 There is no accurate count of state and local MWBE programs or the number of
MWBE certified firms, but they are common in areas with large minority populations.6
Race and gender preferential contracting programs have always had an uneasy relationship with equal protection principles. Although a federal minority business program survived a United States
Supreme Court decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick,7 in two later landmark decisions, City of Richmond v. Croson8 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,9 the Court adopted the strict scrutiny standard for
race-based contracting programs at any level of government. Specifically, such programs would need to have a compelling interest and be
narrowly tailored to survive.10
Since then, lower courts have made several dozen decisions
applying these standards with mixed results. With the exception of the
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in Rothe v. Department of Defense,11 courts have generally decided
federal preferential contracting programs have a compelling interest.12
In W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp.,13 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found

an 8(a) certification program. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2012). “The purpose of the 8(a) BD
program is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the
American economy through business development.” Id. These businesses must
demonstrate a “potential for success” and must be “unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are
of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States.” 13 C.F.R. §
124.101 (2012).
5
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
AND FY 2010 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 77 (2012).
6
See Certification Overview, MWBE.COM,
http://www.mwbe.com/cert/certification.htm (last visited October 14, 2012).
7
448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (plurality opinion).
8
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
9
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10
Id. at 237.
11
Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Defense, 545 F.3d 1023, 1049 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
12
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155 (10th
Cir. 2000); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th
Cir. 2003); N. Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007).
13
407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005).
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that the state’s implementation of a federal program was not narrowly
tailored.14
State and local funded preferential contracting programs have
fared worse under judicial scrutiny.15 Following Croson, it has been
generally established that without a disparity study identifying contracting discrimination in a local market, thus creating a compelling
interest, procurement programs that give advantages to businesses on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender violate the Equal Protection
Clause.16 Courts,17 federal agencies18 and scholars19 have heavily criticized many of these studies as flawed grounds for establishing a compelling interest. More often, however, where preferential programs
have been terminated or altered by courts, it has been because they
have not been narrowly tailored.20
14

See id. at 1003 (holding that the State of Washington failed to meet its burden of proving that its DBE program is “narrowly tailored to further Congress’s
compelling remedial interest”).
15
Post-Croson courts have found serious flaws in the statistical evidence of
discrimination presented to them. See O’Donnell Constr. Co., v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of
Phila., 91 F.3d. 586, 610 (3rd Cir. 1996); Phillips & Jordan, Inc. v. Watts, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (N.D. Fla. 1998); Webster v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d
1354, 1383 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff’d, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000); Assoc. Util.
Contractors of Md., Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 83 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622 (D. Md. 2000);
Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, Colo., 36 F.3d 1513, 1530–31 (10th
Cir. 1994); Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th
Cir. 2001); Hershell Gill Consulting Eng’r, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 333 F. Supp.
2d 1305, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2004); L. Tarango Trucking v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 181
F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2001). On the other hand, a few courts have been
more favorably disposed toward disparity studies. See Concrete Works of Colorado,
Inc. v. City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 994 (10th Cir. 2003); N. Contracting, Inc. v.
Ill., 473 F.3d 715, 724 (7th Cir. 2007).
16
See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DISPARITY STUDIES AS EVIDENCE OF
DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CONTRACTING 2 (2006).
17
See Phillips & Jordan, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (criticizing the use of census
data in a disparity study for an overinclusive measure of availability) or Associated
Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 50 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (criticizing the overstatement of the percentage of qualified MBEs that can provide public
services).
18
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 25 (2006).
19
See generally Stephen E. Celec, Dan Voich, Jr., E. Joe Nosari & Melvin T.
Stith, Sr., Measuring Disparity in Government Procurement: Problems with Using
Census Data Estimating Availability, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 134 (2000); George R.
La Noue, Who Counts?Measuring the Availability of Minority Businesses for Public
Contracting after Croson, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 793 (1998).
20
See, e.g., W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407
F.3d 983, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Consequently, examining whether the certification process on which
all federal, state, and local race and gender preferential contracting
programs are based is narrowly tailored is a significant issue.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PREFERENTIAL CONTRACTING
PROGRAMS
The passage of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977
(“PWEA”),21 which set aside ten percent of all procurement dollars
awarded under the Act for “minority owned businesses,” began a legislative precedent of using contracting preferences for these firms in
various federal programs. The next year Congress passed Amendments to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, which gave legislative approval to an earlier administrative practice of setting aside
8(a) contracts for “socially or economically disadvantaged individuals.”22 The SBA had determined that Blacks, Hispanics, and Native
Americans were presumptively socially disadvantaged.23 Later, many
of these preferential procurement programs were expanded to include
other minority and women-owned businesses as beneficiaries.24 Soon,
state and local governments across the country initiated such programs.
As is true of most public programs, there were many motivations for what initially were called minority business enterprise
(“MBE”) programs:
(1) To remedy instances of current discrimination against specific minority businesses.25
(2) To overcome the present effects of past discrimination
against minority businesses.26
21

Pub. L. No. 95-28 (91 Stat. 116).
Pub. L. No. 95-507 (92 Stat. 1757) (1978).
23
49 C.F.R. § 26.67(a)(1) (2012).
24
Elizabeth Newell, Administration Takes First Crack at Controversial Women’s Procurement Program, GOV’T. EXEC., (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2010/03/administration-takes-first-crack-atcontroversial-womens-procurement-program/30964/.
25
MD. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF MINORITY AFFAIRS, STATE OF MARYLAND
MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (MBE) PROGRAM SUBGOAL DIRECTIVE AND
GUIDELINES FOR SETTING CONTRACT SUBGOALS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.mdminoritybusiness.org/documents/SubgoalGuidanceImplementationGu
idelinesFinal-website_000.pdf.
26
Id.
22
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(3) To compensate for societal discrimination against some
groups.27
(4) To create new economic strength in the minority communities.28
(5) To create more business competition.29
(6) To respond to the political demands of particular individuals or groups to reallocate public contracts.30
(7) To create new political coalitions to overturn the existing
commercial and political establishment. 31
The PWEA identified the preferred minority groups as Black,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimos, or Aleuts.32 Over time,
however, the SBA, which administered the 8(a) program setting aside
27

Id.
Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Racial Politics: Does it Pay?, 74 SOC.
SCI. Q. 507, 507 (1993) (discussing how MBE programs expanded the number and
revenues of black businesses in cities with black mayors).
29
Minority Business Development Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, OFF. OF
GEN. COUNS., Minority Business Development Agency,
http://www.commerce.gov/os/ogc/minority-business-development-agency (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
30
In a 1995 study, Bates and Williams also found that black businesses experienced an increase in sales and growth in cities run by black mayors who supported
an MBE program. Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Preferential Procurement
Programs and Minority-Owned Businesses, 17 J. URB. AFF. 227, 227–42 (1995). On
the other hand, in a 1996 study, they found that MBE programs that heavily relied on
government contracts, were more likely to go out of business than comparable firms.
Timothy Bates & Darrell Williams, Do Preferential Procurement Programs Benefit
Minority Business?, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 294, 294 (1996). In a 1998 study, Kenneth
Chay and Robert Fairlie found that in the pre-Croson period, MBE set aside programs increased black self-employment. Kenneth Y. Chay & Robert W. Fairlie, Minority Business Set-Asides and Black Self-Employment (December 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=2&c
ad=rja&ved=0CCcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc
%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.196.9952%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=y
Tp7UM6DJouy0QHk3oH4Ag&usg=AFQjCNHCuWsHWTHORQf_beIYkg9JHNID
Q.
31
GEORGE R. LA NOUE, LOCAL OFFICIALS GUIDE TO MINORITY BUSINESS
PROGRAMS AND DISPARITY STUDIES 6–7 (1994).
32
Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006).
28
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federal contracts, formalized a modified definition of recognized minorities.33 Spanish-speaking became Hispanic, since many Hispanics
do not actually use Spanish to communicate.34 Oriental, which was
considered a pejorative term, was expanded to include non-white
Asian nationalities beyond the Far Eastern geographical area.35 Currently, all DBE and most MWBE programs use the same definition of
designated minority groups. The preferred racial and ethnic groups are:
Black Americans; Hispanic Americans; Native Americans (Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, or enrolled members of a Federally or State
recognized Indian Tribe); Asian Pacific Americans (persons with origins from Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei,
Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Taiwan, Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Vietnam, Korea, The Philippines, U.S. Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (Republic of Palau), Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, Samoa, Macao, Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
or Nauru); Subcontinent Asian Americans (persons with origins from
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives Islands
or Nepal).36
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NARROW TAILORING OF PREFERENTIAL
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS
The ten percent set-aside in the PWEA was almost immediately challenged, resulting in the Supreme Court decision in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.37 There were five separate opinions in the case, though the
majority mustered six votes to approve the program.38 There were different theories about why the minority set-aside should be upheld.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, thought the

33

For a description of the SBA administrative process and its decisions about
which groups were considered socially disadvantaged, see generally George La
Noue and John C. Sullivan, Presumptions for Preferences: The Small Business Administration’s Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action, 6 J. POL’Y HIST.
439 (1994). For a more detailed history of the SBA and the 8(a) program, see generally JONATHAN J. BEAN, BIG GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
SCANDALOUS HISTORY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (2001).
34
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006) with 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012).
35
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2006) with 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012).
36
13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012).
37
See 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
38
Id. at 492.
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purpose of the act was within the Congressional spending power39 and
that limited use of race and ethnic criteria on its face did not violate
equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.40 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell thought the
government needed to make some findings of previous illegal discrimination and that Congress had reasonably done so.41 Justice Marshall
asked only if the set-asides were “substantially related” to a remedial
purpose.42 In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that the set-aside provisions were illegally intended to create racial balance in the award of public works contracts and were also
aimed at compensating for social, educational, and economic disadvantage, which were not a monopoly of any race.43 Justice Stevens
added in dissent that as Congress had not made the proper findings and
that as a remedy, the set-asides were overbroad.44
In City of Richmond v. Croson, the Supreme Court confronted
for the first time one of the local limitations of federal preferential contracting programs.45 Richmond had created a program requiring that at
least 30% of local construction dollars go to minority businesses. 46 After suggesting important differences between federal and local authority, the Court rejected Richmond’s arguments and evidence to justify
its program.47
While accepting narrowly tailored race conscious remedial
programs in the “extreme case,”48 the Croson court also announced a
number of restrictions on them.49 Perhaps the most important requirement was that the discrimination had to be carefully identified50 and
39

Id. at 475 (plurality opinion). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1 (“The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.”).
40
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482–83 (plurality opinion).
41
Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
42
Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
43
Id. at 529–30 (Stewart J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 552–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
46
Id. at 477.
47
Id. at 508.
48
Id. at 509.
49
See id. at 498–99 (plurality opinion).
50
Id. at 497 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)
(plurality opinion)) (noting the difference between societal and identified discrimination). See also id. at 499 (assertions about discrimination in an entire industry are inadequate); id. (“It is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in
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would require “searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures.”51 As Justice O’Connor wrote in a plurality opinion: “Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the
scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its
effects.”52 These findings had to go beyond assertions of societal discrimination, because it “without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially classified remedy.”53 Among the proper findings
for a narrowly tailored MBE54 program, the evidence had to focus in
the local market place and could not rely on national data.55 Croson also insisted that the finding of discrimination be specific to a particular
industry, because “a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative
body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.”56
Croson also stands for the proposition that preferential programs must have justification for each major group receiving them.57
Most state and local MWBE programs followed the federal definition
of “minority groups” without any modification for local conditions.
But Justice O’Connor noted the city had no evidence of “past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut
persons in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry,” including whether Richmond ever had any Eskimo or Aleut citizens.58 FinalRichmond absent societal discrimination.”); id. at 507 (“[I]t is almost impossible to
assess whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to identified discrimination in any way.”).
51
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion).
52
Id. at 510.
53
Id. at 497 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276) (plurality opinion).
54
Richmond’s program should be properly called an MBE rather than MWBE
program because women were not included in the beneficiary groups. See id. at 477–
78.
55
Id. at 504 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 487 (1980)) (“Congress explicitly recognized that the scope of the problem would vary from market
area to market area.”). See id. at 500 (finding that statements about discrimination in
the Pittsburgh construction industry have “little probative value in establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry”).
56
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
57
See id. at 506.
58
Id. (“The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may
never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond,
suggests that perhaps the city’s purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.”). This principle has had a major impact on lower courts reviewing MWBE
programs. For example, the recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Rowe v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., stripped women, Hispanics, and
Asians from the state’s MWBE program because of the lack of evidence in the
state’s disparity study to support their inclusion. 615 F.3d 233, 259 (4th Cir. 2010).
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ly, Justice O’Connor noted that many of the barriers impacting minority owned firms appeared to be race neutral, but that “there does not
appear to have been any consideration of the use of race neutral means
to increase minority business participation in city contracting.”59
While the plurality did not require any particular limitation to
Congressional authority to use racial preferences in federal contracting
in Fullilove,60 fifteen years later the Court confronted the issue of
whether the strict scrutiny standards developed in Croson for state and
local MWBE programs should also apply to federal preferential contracting programs in Adarand v. Pena.61 The Court found that there
should be a single standard of strict scrutiny applied to all governmental programs based on racial classifications, which means that DBE
and other federal contracting programs must have a compelling interest and be narrowly tailored.62 While courts have given extensive
guidance on a number of narrow tailoring issues (as discussed above),
they have only indirectly addressed the narrow tailoring implication of
the blanket presumption in the certification process that all minority
and women business owners are socially disadvantaged. For example,
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, dissenting Justices were concerned not only
with the Congressional decision about which groups were eligible for
the ten percent set-aside contracts,63 but also which particular firms
were to be eligible for those contracts. Justice Stewart argued, “In today’s society, it constitutes far too gross of an oversimplification to assume that every single Negro, Spanish-speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo and Aleut potentially interested in construction
contracting currently suffers from the effects of past or present racial
discrimination.”64
Justice Stevens made a similar point:

See also W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 100203; Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 713 (9th Cir. 1997); Builders
Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2001), Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000); O’Donnell
Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
59
Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
60
448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980).
61
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
62
Id.
63
Justice Stevens complained in his Fullilove dissent that there was not a single word in the Act or its legislative history about why the particular groups in
PWEA were selected as beneficiaries. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 535–36.
64
Id. at 530 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Assuming, however, that some firms have been
denied public business for racial reasons, the instant statutory remedy [PWEA] is nevertheless
demonstrably much broader than is necessary to
right any such past wrong. For the statute grants
the special preference to a class that includes
(1) those minority-owned firms that have successfully obtained business in the past on a free
competitive basis and undoubtedly are capable
of doing so in the future as well, (2) firms that
have never attempted to obtain any public business in the past, (3) firms that were initially
formed after the Act was passed, including
those that may have been organized simply to
take advantage of its provisions, (4) firms that
have tried to obtain public business but were
unsuccessful for reasons that are unrelated to
the racial characteristics of their stockholders,
and (5) those firms that have been victimized by
racial discrimination.65
The Court was presented with no empirical evidence about the
distribution of minority firms in these categories, but Justice Stevens
concluded: “In any event, since it is highly unlikely that the composition of the fifth category is at all representative of the entire class of
firms to which the statute grants a valuable preference, it is ill-fitting
to characterize this as a narrowly tailored remedial measure.”66
Croson clarified the standard of review for racial classification
as strict scrutiny, moving the concern for narrowly tailoring the beneficiaries of a remedial race-based contracting program from a dissent
position to that of a plurality opinion.67 Though unconvinced that the
evidence Richmond proffered created a compelling interest for its quota program, Justice O’Connor was clear that some remedies were appropriate where contracting discrimination was identified.68 If systematic exclusion of minority subcontractors by non-minority prime
contractors could be proven, then in the “extreme case,” a narrowly
tailored preference to break down patterns of “deliberate exclusion”
65

Id. at 540–41 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id. at 541 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67
488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989).
68
Id. at 492 (plurality opinion).
66
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could be employed.69 If there were individual instances of a racially
motivated refusal to employ minority subcontractors, “a city would be
justified in penalizing the discriminator and providing appropriate relief to the victim of such discrimination.”70
Once contracting discrimination had been identified, how
should the beneficiaries of the appropriate remedy be determined? Justice O’Connor faulted Richmond for not inquiring into “whether or not
the particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the
effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors.”71 She
suggested that failure was caused by “simple administrative convenience.”72 However, the Court held, “[T]he interest in avoiding the bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly
have suffered the effects of prior discrimination cannot justify a rigid
line drawn on the basis of a suspect classification.”73
The Croson Court did not specifically raise issues about the
MBE certification process,74 but its language suggests that a presumption that all members of a group were victims of societal or contracting
discrimination in a certification process would not be justifiable.
In the majority opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, Justice
O’Connor returned to the question about whether the Constitution requires individualized proof of social or economic disadvantage and
what kind of proof is sufficient.75 Her opinion raised questions about
certification in a number of programs:
[U]nresolved questions remain concerning the
details of the complex regulatory regimes implicated by the use of subcontractor compensation clauses. For example, the SBA's 8(a) program requires an individualized inquiry into the
economic disadvantage of every participant, see
13 CFR § 124.106(a) (1994), whereas the
DOT's regulations implementing STURAA §
106(c) do not require certifying authorities to
make such individualized inquiries, see 49 CFR
69

Id. at 509.
Id.
71
Id. at 508.
72
Id.
73
Id. (criticizing administrative convenience as a defense where constitutional
rights are involved).
74
See generally id.
75
515 U.S. 200, 208 (1995).
70
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§ 23.62 (1994); 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D, App.
C (1994). And the regulations seem unclear as
to whether 8(d) subcontractors must make individualized showings, or instead whether the
race-based presumption applies both to social
and economic disadvantage, compare 13 CFR §
124.106(b) (1994) (apparently requiring 8(d)
participants to make an individualized showing), with 48 CFR § 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (apparently allowing 8(d) subcontractors to invoke
the race-based presumption for social and economic disadvantage). See generally Part I, supra. We also note an apparent discrepancy between the definitions of which socially
disadvantaged individuals qualify as economically disadvantaged for the 8(a) and 8(d) programs; the former requires a showing that such
individuals' ability to compete has been impaired "as compared to others in the same or
similar line of business who are not socially
disadvantaged," 13 CFR § 124.106(a)(1)(i)
(1994) (emphasis added), while the latter requires that showing only "as compared to others
in the same or similar line of business," §
124.106(b)(1). The question whether any of the
ways in which the Government uses subcontractor compensation clauses can survive strict
scrutiny, and any relevance distinctions such as
these may have to that question, should be addressed in the first instance by the lower
courts.76
Justice O’Connor did not purport to settle these questions about
certification, since the record before the Court did not permit it, but
she was clearly insisting that the question of individualized finding for
beneficiaries of a race-based program was a legitimate subject for judicial review.
What followed was quite unpredictable. On remand, the district
court found that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause (“SCC”), the
provision that awarded a bonus to prime contractors for using minority
76

Id. at 238–39 (emphasis in original).
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subcontractors, and the presumption of social and economic disadvantage used in the certification process were not narrowly tailored.77
The court reviewed the various preferential contracting that used the
presumption and held:
The statutes and regulations governing the SCC
program are overinclusive in that they presume
that all those in the named minority group
members are economically and, in some acts
and regulations, socially disadvantaged. This
presumption is flawed, as is its corollary, namely that the majority (caucasians) as well as
members of other (unlisted) minority groups are
not socially and or/ economically disadvantaged. By excluding certain minority groups
whose members are economically and socially
disadvantaged due to past and present discrimination, the SCC program is underinclusive.78
Adarand then filed suit against Colorado state officials, arguing
that its administration of the federal highway DBE program was also
unconstitutional.79 In the face of this challenge, Colorado changed its
DBE certification guidelines by eliminating the presumption of social
and economic disadvantage for minorities and opening up certification
to anyone who affirmed he was socially disadvantaged.80 The district
court hearing the case against the state program reasoned that the SCC
program and its racial presumptions made Adarand’s owner, Randy
Pech, socially disadvantaged as a white male, and therefore he had a
remedy of becoming a DBE himself.81 On appeal, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated on the grounds
that Pech, now a DBE, no longer had standing.82 Pech then sought review by the Supreme Court, and there found a more sympathetic audi77

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1570 (D. Colo.
1997), vacated sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292 (10th
Cir. 1999) cert. granted 528 U.S. 216 (2000), and rev'd. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000).
78
Adarand Constructors, Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 1580.
79
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Romer, 174 F.R.D. 100, 101–02 (D. Colo.
1997).
80
Adarand Constructors, Inc. 169 F.3d at 1296.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1296–97.
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ence.83 Once again Adarand was before the Supreme Court, and the
Tenth Circuit’s opinion was again reversed.84
The certification issue was not raised in subsequent litigation,
however, until it came into judicial purview in a challenge to the state
administration of a DBE program. In W. States Paving Co., the Washington State Department of Transportation, lacking a completed disparity study, tried to argue that its collection of sworn DBE certification affidavits constituted appropriate evidence of discrimination. 85
The Ninth Circuit was not impressed and responded:
[E]ven if we were to consider these affidavits,
they do not provide any evidence of discrimination within Washington's transportation contracting industry. Notwithstanding the State's
express representation to the contrary during
oral argument, these affidavits do not require
prospective DBEs to certify that they have been
victims of discrimination in the contracting industry. Rather, as mandated by the federal regulations, the owner of a firm applying for DBE
status need only attest to having been subjected
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias, or
having suffered the effects of discrimination,
because of his identity as a member of one or
more minority groups, without regard to his individual qualities. Such claims of general societal discrimination--and even generalized assertions about discrimination in an entire industry-cannot be used to justify race-conscious remedial measures.86

83

Adarand Constructors, Inc., 528 U.S. at, 223–24 (per curiam).
Id. at 224 (per curiam).
85
W. States Paving Co. v. Washington State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983,
1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005).
86
Id. at 1002 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996) ("[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest."); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy.").
84
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While the thrust of the court’s dicta was that the certification
affidavits were not appropriate to establish the necessary predicate for
Washington state’s administration of a DBE program, its language can
also be read to imply that such affidavits are too broad to sustain a
finding that any individual owner is entitled to benefit from a race conscious remedial measure.87 As the court noted, attesting to being a victim of societal discrimination is not a narrowly tailored predicate for
such an individual remedy.88
Although all of these opinions suggest the certification process
and its criteria are legitimate subjects for judicial review, none of them
constitute an in-depth analysis of that process or contain a definitive
judicial pronouncement about whether it is narrowly tailored.
IV. CERTIFICATION OF PROCESS
While courts have frequently addressed the narrow tailoring issue of whether the groups preferred in DBE and MWBE programs
were overinclusive,89 the narrowly tailoring problems in the certification process and criteria have not been fully examined. Almost all
preferential contracting programs require as a condition of participation that individual firm owners seek certification as a DBE or 8(a)
firm for federal procurement or as a MWBE for state and local procurement.90 Without such certification a business cannot receive a setaside contract or be counted in meeting a subcontracting goal set by
the jurisdiction.
The need for contemporary certification processes is a legacy
of the federal government’s response to the Adarand decision, but the
criteria and language used in them go back to earlier decisions made
by the SBA.91 Recognizing after Adarand that both the compelling interest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny would now be applied to federal contracting programs using racial classifications, the
Clinton administration, following the President’s “Mend Don’t End”
philosophy, moved to shore up the compelling interest for such programs and to narrowly tailor their administration.92
87

See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 1002.
Id.
89
See generally supra note 58.
90
See 49 C.F.R. § 26.83 (2012).
91
See BEAN, supra note 33, at 102.
92
Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096 (Feb. 2, 1999). See U. S. COMM’N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 34–46 (2006).
88
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The focus of this effort was the various transportation subsidy
programs, which like the PWEA, had required that ten percent of the
dollars spent had to go to MBEs. The Department of Commerce commissioned a disparity study, but it showed very mixed patterns of under and over utilization depending on the type of construction industry
and the regions of the country.93 The Department of Justice contracted
with the Urban Institute to do a meta-study of existing state and local
disparity studies, but meta-studies depend on the validity of the original studies.94 Many of those studies used methodologies that were later
invalidated in litigation.95 The Department of Justice also produced
Appendix A to “Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action Federal Procurement,” which was a compendium of existing disparity studies and
other research to buttress its position that a compelling interest existed.96
In narrowly tailoring the administration of the federal transportation program, it was decided that a national ten percent quota was no
longer defensible. Consequently, it was left to state and local recipients
of federal transportation dollars to determine the size of their DBE
goals according to their determination of the level of DBE participation that would be expected absent discrimination in their marketplaces.97 Sometimes that resulted in DBE goals lower than ten percent,
sometimes much higher.98
One narrow tailoring change that was not made was to reexamine the particular racial and ethnic groups eligible for the presumption of social and economic disadvantage.99 These groups have
essentially remained the same since the enactment of the PWEA.
93

Small Disadvantaged Business Procurement: Reform of Affirmative Action
in Federal Procurement, 63 Fed. Reg. 71724, 71724 (Dec. 29, 1998).
94
See U. S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 35.
95
See id. at 39–40 n. 52.
96
Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed.
Reg. 26042, 26051–63 (May 23, 1996).
97
49 C.F.R. § 26.45(b) (2012).
98
For a report on the process and outcomes of post-Adarand DBE goal setting
in all fifty states, see George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 443–51
(2006). For a discussion of the process and outcomes of post-Adarand DBE goals
setting in airports, see generally George R. La Noue, Follow the Money: Who Benefits From the Federal Aviation Administration’s DBE Program?, 38 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 480 (2008).
99
See generally George R. La Noue & John Sullivan, Gross Presumptions:
Determining Group Eligibility for Federal Procurement Preferences, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 103 (2000).
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There were, however, some narrow tailoring changes in the DBE certification process in the articulation of the concepts of social and economic disadvantage. Since many state and local governments participate in or follow the standards of the Uniform Certification
Program,100 the effect of the federal DBE changes was also to restructure simultaneously state and local MWBE certification procedures.
Since one set of state and local administrators manage both the DBE
and MWBE certification process, it is obviously more administratively
efficient for them and firms seeking certification to use common criteria and forms.
Certification plans are based on social and economic considerations, which purport to demonstrate disadvantage. Any person who
owns fifty-one percent of a business and identifies with one of the designated minority groups or who is a woman is “presumed” to be socially and economically disadvantaged.101 These concepts were borrowed from earlier decisions by the SBA in administering its 8(a)
program.102 In the certification process, however, the two prongs are
treated differently.
A. Proving Economic Disadvantage
During the post-Adarand Congressional debate on the DBE
program, opponents hammered away at the idea that very wealthy
people could own a DBE.103 Consequently, proponents argued that the
proposed new DBE regulations would restrict DBE owners to persons
who were “economically disadvantaged” because of the low size of
their net worth and because their businesses were considered small
businesses according to the standards set by the SBA.104 In determining the limits of a DBE’s applicant’s net worth, the USDOT also bor-

100

See 49 C.F.R, § 26.81 (1997) (describing the Unified Certification Program). The Uniform process is required to be used by all recipients of federal funds.
Id. § 26.81(a). It may operate jointly in two or more states, and firms certified in one
state may be automatically certified in another state. Id. § 26.81(e).
101
49 C.F.R § 26.67 (2012).
102
BEAN, supra note 33, at 102.
103
Id. at 103.
104
SBA was driven to set an objective limit to defining economic disadvantage
because, as SBA administrator Vernon Weaver recalled in an earlier period, “‘It
boils down to a judgment call . . . . I must have spent a couple of hundred hours with
my general counsel . . . discussing: What the hell is ‘economic disadvantage?” Id.
102–03.
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rowed SBA criteria from the 8(a) minority set-aside program.105 A
DBE owner’s net worth had to be below $750,000, excluding the value
of the owner’s principal residence and the value of the owner’s business.106 Not only do DBE applicants have to swear in affidavits that
they meet those criteria, they must also submit to personal interviews
and provide detailed documents to verify those facts.107 Certification
authorities then carefully monitor the documentation about economic
disadvantage in the certification application.
Narrow tailoring questions still can be raised about the definition of economic disadvantage, particularly since the definition of net
worth limit was raised in January 2011 to $1.32 million.108 To put that
federally determined cutoff into context, according to the 2010 census,
the national average household net worth, excluding the equity in a
home and a business, was $46,740.109
There is another narrow tailoring issue. The economic disadvantaged section of the affidavit, apparently realizing that creating an
abstract dollar definition of economic disadvantage would include
many whites males, requires DBE applicants to attribute their “low”
net worth because their “ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line of business who
are not socially disadvantaged.”110 Statements in the affidavit are made
and executed under oath and the penalty of perjury. Just how a person
105

See Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5098 (Feb. 2, 1999).
106
Id. In 1995, Phillip Lader, SBA Administrator, testified that, even by using
family net worth, rather than individual net worth, more than 91% of all business
owners would have been considered economically disadvantaged because they were
below the $750,000 limit. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Minority Business Development Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus., 104th
Cong. 14–29 (1995) (statement of Philip Lader, Adm’r of the U.S. Small Bus. Admin.).
107
See e.g., 49 C.F.R § 26.67(b)(3) (2012).
108
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise: Program Improvements, 76 Fed. Reg.
5098, 5099 (Jan. 28, 2011). In some state and local MWBE programs, the owner net
worth limits are higher. In the New York state program, for example, the economically disadvantage limit is $3,500,000. DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV.,
EMPIRE STATE DEV., ATTACHMENT A: NYS MWBE CERTIFICATION INDIVIDUAL
PERSONAL NET WORTH AFFIDAVIT. The recently enacted Milwaukee MWBE program had no owner net worth limitations at all. See MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE
ORDINANCES ch. 370 (2012).
109
See Wealth and Asset Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
110
49 C.F.R § 26 App. E (2012).
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is able to swear under oath that they have the breadth of information
about the capital and credit of their competitors is uncertain. Does the
term “others” mean most or some competitors? If a person had not experienced difficulty in raising money for a business, could he honestly
sign the economic disadvantage affidavit? Though it would be possible
for certification authorities to require evidence that a firm had tried
and failed to receive credit or a loan, applicants who are presumed
economically disadvantaged are not asked to supply that information.111
B. Asserting Social Disadvantage
This Article is more focused on whether the definition of social
disadvantage is narrowly tailored, because if a person is not classified
as socially disadvantaged, their economic status is irrelevant. Social
disadvantage in DBE programs and most often in MWBE programs is
established in a two-step process. First, a minority or female owner
checks a box indicating group identification in one of the designated
groups: Female, Black American, Asian-Pacific American, Hispanic
American, Native American, Sub-Continent Asian-American, or Other.112 Second, such a person then signs a one-sentence affidavit claiming:
I certify that I am socially disadvantaged because I have been subjected to racial or ethnic
prejudice or cultural bias, or have suffered the
effects of discrimination, because of my identity
as a member of one or more of the groups identified above, without regard to my individual
qualities.113
Since members of such groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, certification authorities ask for no proof of an applicant’s

111

See generally DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV., supra note 108.
See, e.g., CAL. UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, DISADVANTAGED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (DBE) CERTIFICATION APPLICATION 4 (2011), available at
http://www.caltrans.ca.gov/hq/bep/downloads/pdf/DBE_Application.pdf.;
DIV. OF MINORITY & WOMEN BUS. DEV., EMPIRE STATE DEV., NEW YORK STATE
MWBE CERTIFICATION SUPPLEMENTAL APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT 4 (2012),
available at
http://www.esd.ny.gov/MWBE/Data/Application/MWBE_Fast_Track_ForEII.pdf.
113
See, e.g., CAL. UNIFIED CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 17.
112
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claim about being subject to ethnic prejudice or ethnic bias or suffering the effects of discrimination.114
The social disadvantage certification presumption raises two
narrow tailoring issues: (1) whether the affidavit language on its face
meets the standards courts have set for remediable action in contracting and (2) whether these affidavits distinguish between those particular business-owners who have actually suffered from the kind of discrimination properly remedied by a preferential contracting program
and those making inappropriate claims.
For persons identified with the designated racial, ethnic, and
gender groups, the presumption of being socially disadvantaged exists
in all preferential contracting programs. However, what does “identified” mean in a country that has an increasing number of mixed race
and ethnic persons who have multiple or weak identifications with any
group? SBA regulations define the concept of identification as follows: “An individual must demonstrate that he or she has held himself
or herself out, and is currently identified by others, as a member of a
designated group if SBA requires it.”115 Except for some groups such
as Native American tribes, however, no concept of “official” racial or
ethnic member of a designated group exists. In reality, group identification for the SBA and USDOT recipients is established by checking
one of these boxes on the application form.116
Group identification is only the first step for an owner seeking
certification for a business. Since it might be thought that granting
public contracting preferences to any person identified with designated
racial, ethnic, and gender groups is not a narrowly tailored remedy, the
regulations also require the owner applying for certification to be “socially and economically disadvantaged.”117 Persons so identified with
the designated groups, however, are “presumed” to be socially and
economically disadvantaged. This presumption, in theory, can be challenged. The SBA regulations state: “The presumption of social disadvantage may be overcome with credible evidence to the contrary. Individuals possessing or knowing of such evidence should submit the
information in writing to the Associate Administrator for Business
Development (“AA/BD”) for consideration.”118
114

See generally id. (omitting any indication that the applicant must provide
proof of being subject to ethnic prejudice or ethnic bias or suffering the effects of
discrimination).
115
13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b)(2) (2012).
116
George R. La Noue & John C. Sullivan, supra 99, at 149–50.
117
13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2012).
118
Id. § 124.103(b)(3) (2012).
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USDOT recipients are also required to follow a procedure for
challenges.119 The regulations state nine procedural steps for such a
challenge (e.g., the complaint must be in writing, recipients must provide written notice to firms deemed ineligible, must provide opportunity for a hearing, etc.)120
On the surface then, the rebuttable process looks like a wellarticulated administrative procedure that might contribute to narrow
tailoring. Nevertheless, some judges have been skeptical about whether the presumption can in fact be challenged. Federal Court of Appeals
Judge Richard Posner noted, “The presumption can be rebutted, but
given the difficulty of establishing whether a particular individual is
socially and economically disadvantaged the availability of the disadvantage is likely to be decisive.”121 Was Posner right about the possibility of rebuttal? In defining the substantive standards for a challenge,
the regulations essentially repeat the criteria used in the social disadvantage affidavit described in Part III of this Article.122 The only substantive difference is that in addition to the language “socially disadvantaged individuals” the phrase “disability” has been added.123
There is one huge omission, however. The regulations do not
address the circumstance when an individual’s life experiences might
mean that they have outgrown the socially disadvantaged designation.124 All owners seeking certification need to do is swear that at one
time in their life they were subjected to group-based prejudice or bias.
C. The Case of Marco Rubio
To illustrate this issue, consider the career of Marco Rubio (R.
Fla.). Mr. Rubio was born in Miami to parents of Cuban exiles125 and,

119

See 49 C.F.R. § 26.87 (2012).
Id.
121
Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass’n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir.
1991).
122
See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012).
123
See id. The regulations state that the Department is aware that “people with
disabilities have disproportionately low incomes and high rates of unemployment . . .
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in recognition of the discrimination faced by people with disabilities.” Id. § 26 App. E(II) (2012).
124
See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012) (omitting any reference to procedures regarding when an individual might outgrow the socially disadvantaged designation).
125
About Marco, MARCO RUBIO: U.S. SENATOR FOR FLA.,
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/biography (last visited Sept. 27,
2012),
120
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thus, is clearly identified as Hispanic.126 In Miami, however, there is
some question as to whether the Cuban-American community is disadvantaged as a whole.127 But what about Mr. Rubio as an individual?
Is he currently socially disadvantaged?
He graduated from the University of Florida and then received
his J.D. from the University of Miami in 1996.128 Did his educational
achievement make him no longer “socially disadvantaged”? Mr. Rubio
served as a City Commissioner for West Miami and was then elected
to the Florida House of Representatives in 1999.129 In 2006, Mr. Rubio
was elected Speaker of the Florida House,130 indicating his acceptability on a statewide basis far beyond Cuban-American neighborhoods.
Three years later, he began his campaign for the United States Senate,
first toppling incumbent Governor Charlie Crist in the Republican
primary and then beating his Democratic opponent in the general election.131 Currently, he serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is the ranking member on one of its subcommittees.132 Would
any of his political accomplishments render Mr. Rubio no longer “socially disadvantaged” and, if so, which ones?
Suppose Mr. Rubio had purchased a business and had sought
certification for that business in the DBE or 8(a) programs as a “socially disadvantaged” owner. Even though Mr. Rubio’s success is wellknown, could anyone successfully rebut his claim to be socially disadvantaged and at what stage of his meteoric career could such a challenge be effective? The answer is probably no one, because, although
the process for such a challenge exists in the regulations, the criteria
do not. The regulations do not identify particular achievements
126

Roughly fifteen percent of Hispanics in the United States now marry caucasians, Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T. Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial Marriage in a Multiracial Society, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1065, 1073 (2011), but the
regulations only require that the certification applicant identify with a presumptively
disadvantaged group.
127
For an explanation of what is often called the Cuban-American economic
miracle in Miami, see generally MIGUEL GONZALEZ-PANDO, THE CUBANAMERICANS 117–40 (1998).
128
Marco Rubio – Biography, REPUBLICAN BUS. COUNCIL,
http://www.republicanbusinesscouncil.com/bios/rubio_bio.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,
2012).
129
Marco Rubio, BIO. TRUE STORY, www.biography.com/people/marco-rubio20840041 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. SENATE
http://www.senate.gov/general/committee_membership/committee_memberships_SS
FR.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
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through which a person identified with the designated groups could
emerge from a “socially disadvantaged” status. Therefore, if birth determines whether a person is forever “socially disadvantaged,” and
there is no practical way for that status to change or be challenged,
then the presumption will not yield narrowly tailored results.
Since the criteria do not exist by which a challenger might assert that a particular owner was not actually socially disadvantaged,
there would be no clear basis for such a challenge. What Judge Posner
suspected can be demonstrated empirically. Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) requests to SBA and the Maryland Department of
Transportation disclose that no challenges were made concerning the
“social disadvantage” status of any of the roughly 9,000 8(a) firms or
6,000 DBE firms in Maryland between January 2003 and October
2011.133 Of course, the fact that Maryland DOT has had no complaints
in eight years134 does not eliminate the possibility that there has been
such activity in other states. Without articulated criteria for determining when someone is no longer socially disadvantaged, however, such
complaints are unlikely.
If it is the case that as a practical matter the status of being “socially disadvantaged” is a permanent status when a person is identified
with one of the designated racial, ethnic, or gender groups and that no
person can challenge that disadvantaged status designation by showing
an owner’s individual achievement, then the presumption challenge
process does little to narrowly tailor the certification process.
D. Certification for Individuals without a Designated
Group Identification
During the post-Adarand debate on the future of the DBE program, proponents emphasized that persons who were not identified
with designated groups could become certified DBEs as evidence that
the program really was narrowly tailored.135 Like the claim that the social disadvantage presumption can be rebutted, the claims about nondesignated group owner participation as DBEs do not describe the way
the program really works. The regulations state that an applicant seek133

Emails from Joan Elliston, Program Analyst, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., to
author and Zenita Wickham Hurley, Director, Office of Md. MBE (Sept. 23, 2011)
(on file with author).
134
Id.
135
Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5099 (Feb. 2, 1999).
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ing DBE status as an individual rather than as a member of a designated group must have:
A. At least one objective distinguishing feature that has
contributed to social disadvantage, such as race, ethnic
origin, gender, disability, long term residence in an environment isolated from the mainstream of American
society, or other similar causes not common to individuals who are not socially disadvantaged.
B. Personal experiences of substantial and chronic social
disadvantage in American society.136
The key language, however, is that certifying recipients will
consider evidence about various forms of discrimination in education,
employment, and business history “to see if the totality of circumstances shows disadvantage in entering into or advancing in the business world.”137 In contrast, neither any sort of evidence of substantial
and chronic disadvantage nor an evaluation of totality of circumstances are required to award certification to persons identified with the
designated groups.138 As a consequence, except for a few disabled persons, there are very few owners who are certified DBEs who are not
members of designated groups. In a 2004 study of Federal Aviation
Administration awards across the country, DBEs not affiliated with a
designated group received only 3% of DBE contracts and less than 1%
of these dollars.139
V. EVIDENCE FROM DISPARITY STUDIES
After rejecting the various forms of evidence Richmond relied
upon to support its MBE program, Justice O’Connor offered a formula
in her Croson opinion for beginning the process of establishing proof
of discrimination. She argued, “Where there is a significant statistical
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing
and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contrac-

136

49 C.F.R. § 26, App. E(I) (2012).
Id. § 26, App. E(I)(C) (emphasis added).
138
See id. § 26 App. E(I).
139
George R. La Noue, Follow the Money: Who Benefits From the Federal
Aviation Administration’s DBE Program?, supra note 98, at 494.
137
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tors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.”140
A lesson many jurisdictions took from this Croson language
was that to maintain or establish an MWBE program, they needed to
commission a disparity study. About 350 of these studies have been
completed at a cost of at least $140 million.141 These studies examine
whether there are significant statistical disparities in the availability
and utilization of MWBEs compared to non-MWBEs in the award of
government contracts.142 The crucial issue is whether availability is
measured according to Croson’s standards of comparing the number of
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform special services with the number actually retained. Often, that standard has not
been met.143
Even if a valid statistical disparity were found, Croson states it
would only create an inference of discrimination,144 so most studies also engage in anecdotal research as an attempt to understand whether a
discriminatory context exists that would explain the found disparities.145 Typically, the disparity consultant will form focus groups or
conduct phone or mail surveys to ask questions about respondent expe140

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (plurality

opinion).
141

The Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts collection of disparity
studies in the Albin O. Kuhn library at the University of Maryland Baltimore County
houses 280 such studies.
142
See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITYAND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK 381
(2010).
143
Croson, 488 U.S. at 501–02 (“[W]here special qualifications are necessary,
the relevant statistical pool for the purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.)”.
The Croson Court then criticized Richmond because it had no data regarding “how
many MBE’s in the relevant market are qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects.” Id. at 502. Various circuit courts have
emphasized the necessity of measuring qualifications and firm capacity. See
O’Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 426 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade Cnty. 122 F.3d 895, 920–
21 (11th. Cir. 1997); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d
730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1045
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
144
Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
145
On the other hand, anecdotes alone are generally not considered to be a sufficient predicate for a preferential contracting program. “While anecdotal evidence
may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimination, rarely, if ever, can such evidence show a systemic pattern of discrimination necessary for the adoption of an
affirmative action plan…[T]he MBE program cannot stand without a proper statistical foundation.” Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).
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riences with discrimination.146 Generally, these results will be reported
in snippets of quotes or paraphrases without attribution to any person
or firm.147 Often these anecdotes will reflect complaints of societal
discrimination,148 which Croson and other court decisions have found
are not enough to support race-based decisions. Some of these anecdotes, if true, will reflect incidents of discrimination, which would require individual remedies. A few reflect more generalized problems
that might fit Croson’s standard of an extreme case of “patterns of deliberate exclusion.”149
The anecdotal sections of disparity studies also have been subjected to various criticisms.150 The major problem with disparity study
anecdotal sections is that rarely is there a quantitative report on the
frequency of alleged discriminatory incidents.151 For example, if a
study reports one respondent has had a problem with a biased building
inspector, the reader has no way to tell whether that is an isolated or
endemic problem. Such anecdotes contribute little to understanding
whether Croson’s “patterns of deliberate exclusion” exist and cannot
contribute to evaluating whether the blanket presumption of social disadvantage in the certification process for members of some groups is
narrowly tailored.
Some disparity studies, however, do quantify their results from
mail surveys.152 Though the evidence is not perfect (return rates are
frequently low, and there is no verification about the truth of any allegation), these studies provide some evidence about the perceptions minority and women owned business owners have about the extent of
discrimination they face.153

146

See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND (FINAL REPORT) 13 (2006).
147
See, e.g., id. at 226–32.
148
See, e.g., id.
149
Croson, 488 U.S at 509.
150
See Jeffrey M. Hanson, Note, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdotal Evidence Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public
Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433, 1437 (2003) (arguing that state policymakers have not sufficiently scrutinized the anecdotal sections of disparity studies
and subsequently have allowed narratives of actual discrimination to be undervalued); See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 78.
151
See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Columbus, 936 F. Supp
1363, 1413–15 (S.D. Ohio 1996), vacated on other grounds 172 F.3d 411 (1999).
152
See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 218–26.
153
See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 936 F. Supp 1363 at 1415–
19, vacated on other grounds 172 F.3d 411 (1999).
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Such evidence of minority and women’s perceptions of discrimination has existed for at least two decades. In 1990, the Minnesota Center for Survey Research published the results of a survey of
about 700 minority and women business owners within that state.154 In
answer to the question of whether you believe “your business has been
hampered by discrimination against you as a minority or female,”
about two-thirds of the respondents said no.155 Since roughly twothirds of the owners had participated in a “purchasing preference or a
set-aside program” for MWBEs and approximately two-thirds had
been awarded contracts or purchases under these programs, it is likely
most of the respondents were owners of certified businesses.156 Of
those claiming to have experienced an instance of discrimination, less
than 10% filed any sort of complaint.157 In a more recent disparity
study for the City of Milwaukee, 7.1% and 3.9% of firm owners who
did business with the city claimed they had suffered discrimination because of race/ethnicity or gender by that government, respectively.158
The National Economic Research Associates (“NERA”) is one
of the largest producers of disparity studies.159 Most of their studies
survey MWBEs about their experience with various forms of discrimination or barriers to business formation.160 Some NERA studies thus
permit an examination of whether DBEs/MWBEs believe they have
been discriminated against in their application for credit. They would
need to affirm in the certification process that “my ability to compete
in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line of business.”161 Figure A displays the answer to the question
about commercial loan credit from a wide variety of jurisdictions.

154

MINN. DEP’T. OF ADMIN., A STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMENMINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES AND OF OTHER SMALL-BUSINESS TOPICS 47
(1990).
155
See id. at 51.
156
See id. at 52.
157
Id. at 49.
158
D. WILSON CONSULTING GROUP, DISPARITY STUDY FOR THE CITY OF
MILWAUKEE 9-45 (2010).
159
MBW/WBE/DBE Availability and Disparity Studies, NERA.COM,
http://wwwnera.com/59-2147.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
160
See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236
(highlighting the different areas where various firms have indicated that they have
been treated less favorably due to race).
161
See, e.g., 13 C.F.R. § 127.203 (2012).
AND
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Figure A162
Percentage of Firms Indicating They Had Been Treated Less
Favorably Due to Race and/or Gender in Applying for
Commercial Loans
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African
American
43.1

Hispanic

NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236; NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RACE, SEX,
AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L
ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK 381 (2010); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM BROWARD COUNTY 343 (2010); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MINNEAPOLIS 246 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MARYLAND 491 (2011); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM STATE OF UTAH 309 (2009).
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As Figure A shows, while responses vary in different jurisdictions and among different groups, there is a discernible pattern. African-Americans owners are most likely to believe they have been treated less favorably in seeking credit, while white women are least likely
to share that sentiment. In no group does even a majority claim unfavorable treatment in seeking credit.
The social disadvantage certification process, however, asks
for affirmation of a much broader claim than does the economic certification requirement. It asks whether respondents have “been subjected
to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American Society
because of their identities as members of [minority] groups, and without regard to their individual qualities.”163 No disparity study in its anecdotal section has asked a question that broadly, but NERA studies do
ask respondents whether they believe they had been “treated less favorably due to race and/or sex while participating in business dealings,” in fourteen different business categories.164 Respondents were
asked to check “yes” or “no” in a box for each category. 165 It would
have been instructive if the NERA studies had followed up on their
surveys to find out more about what incidents persons were referring
to when they believed they were subjected to discrimination. While
some of the percentages are disturbingly high, no further information
about the character of the incident is available. The aggregated results
from recent NERA studies can be seen below.166

163

P.R. DEP’T TRANP., CERTIFICATION OF SOCIAL & ECONOMIC
DISADVANTAGE: PERSONAL NET WORTH 1 (2012), available at
http://www.dtop.gov.pr/pdf/det_social_disadvantage.pdf.
164
See, e.g., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, supra note 146, at 236.
165
See id.
166
Research on the NERA studies in Figure A and B was conducted by John
C. Sullivan, Associate Director of the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts,
July 2011.
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Figure B167
NERA Disparity Studies Asking About Various Forms of Business
Discrimination
Jurisdiction

State of MD
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(2008)
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Minneapolis, MN
(2010)
State of MD
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50.5%

64.5%

35.2%

50.8%

52.6%

64.4%

49.6%

70.1%

51.0%

62.5%

46.3%

67.9%

56.8%

72.7%

40.6%

61.9%

46.7%

69.1%

61.2%

NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., supra note 146, at 236 (2006);
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
NEW YORK 381 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE OF
MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
BROWARD COUNTY 343 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
MINNEAPOLIS 246 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE
OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
MARYLAND 491 (2011); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF
MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE OF
MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE STATE
OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM STATE
OF UTAH 307 (2009).
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As Figure B shows, across many different NERA studies in
different parts of the country, there was a roughly similar pattern in respondent answers. About three-fifths of women business owners and
two-fifths of minority business owners did not claim they had suffered
from discrimination in any form of business dealings. It cannot be determined how many of these business owners NERA surveyed had
signed the certification affidavit claiming they had suffered from racial
prejudice, cultural bias, or discrimination. The NERA sample, however, was confined to owners who indicated their firms had worked or
attempted to work in the public sector in the last five years, so it would
have made sense for many of these firms to seek certification. Plausibly, certified firms would be overrepresented in disparity study anecdotal sections, since they would have the most interest in continuing
MWBE programs,168 but one cannot be sure about the proportions of
certified and non-certified firms in any of the NERA samples.
Who most often reports discrimination tends to vary not only
by the group identification but also by the type of business involved.
Figure C illustrates responses of 4,500 Texas MWBEs or Historically
Underutilized Businesses (“HUBs”), as they are called in that state, to
a very broad question asking if they had experienced at least one instance of any sort of discrimination in the last five years.

168

In Engineering Contractors Ass’n of S. Florida v. Metro. Dade Cnty., for
example, the trial court expressed doubt about whether self interest might taint anecdotal reports. 943 F.Supp. 1546, 1579 (S.D.Fla. 1996). “. . . [I]ndividuals who have a
vested interest in preserving a benefit or entitlement may be motivated to view
events in a manner that justifies the entitlement.” Id. “Consequently, it is important
that both sides are heard and that there are other measures of the accuracy of the
claims. Attempts to investigate and verify the anecdotal evidence should be made.”
Id.
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Figure C169
Percentage of Texas Hubs in Specific Industries Who Report at
Least One Instance of Discrimination in the Last Five Years

Race/ Sex Group

Construction

Commodities

Total Average

44.8

Professional and
Other Services
41.7

African American

48.4

Hispanic

35.2

19.6

24.1

24.1

Asian

38.9

16.9

26.1

22.7

Native American

27.6

24.4

19.1

22.7

Total Minorities

38.5

26.4

29.7

29.6

White Women

19.1

9.7

16.3

13.6

Total Average HUBS

31.9

18.2

24.4

22.8

43.5

As reported in Figure C, no majority of owners in any group
claims to have suffered from discrimination, though there are some
clear patterns. Again, African-Americans are most likely to claim discrimination and white women are the least likely to do so. Discrimination is more often claimed by firm owners in the construction industry
than by businesses in commodities and professional or other services.
In a few studies, NERA found some groups of MWBE business owners claimed to have experienced less business discrimination
than non-MWBEs, but that was not the common pattern.170

169

NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., STATE OF TEXAS DISPARITY
STUDY, xxiv (1994), available at http://hub.tamus.edu/Documents/Disparity%20
Study.pdf.
170
See NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE
FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMENOWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010).
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Figure D171
Disparity Studies Where Some Minorities Claimed Less
Discrimination in Any Business Dealings than White Males
STUDY

GROUP

Austin, TX
(2008)
Memphis, TN
(2008)
Augusta, GA
(2009)
Northeast, OH
(2010)

NATIVE
AMERICAN
HISPANIC
NATIVE
AMERICAN
ASIAN

PERCENTAGE OF
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CLAIMING
DISCRIMINATION
31.0%

PERCENTAGE OF
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CLAIMING
DISCRIMINATION

20.0%

26.2%

20.0%

26.1%

21.4%

26.6%

32.7%

In both the NERA and the other disparity studies discussed
here, certified and non-certified firms were included in their samples.
However, a disparity study for Fulton County, Georgia in metropolitan
Atlanta, conducted by Thomas Boston, an economics professor at The
Georgia Institute of Technology, surveyed only certified MWBEs to
obtain anecdotes.172 Of 73 respondents, only 16% believed they had
encountered discrimination by Fulton County in the past and only 12%
believed such discrimination was still continuing.173 On the other
hand, 52% felt that they had encountered discrimination in seeking financing and credits; 20% agreed they had encountered bonding discrimination; and 53% agreed that they had been discriminated against
by majority-owned firms in the past.174

171

NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM THE CITY OF AUSTIN 249 (2008); NAT’L ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RACE, SEX, AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE
FROM AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 272 (2009); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC.,
THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE
FROM NORTHEAST OHIO 310 (2010); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE
STATE OF MINORITY- AND WOMAN- OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 276 (2008).
172
Webster v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (N.D.Ga. 1999).
173
Id. at 1379.
174
Id. When a federal district court reviewed the statistical and anecdotal evidence in the studies Fulton County relied on, , it found the county’s MFBE program
did not have a compelling interest. Id. at 1382.
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In short, in a variety of disparity studies completed by different
consultants in different parts of the country at different times, when
MWBEs were asked whether they believe they had experienced discrimination or unfavorable treatment because of their race, ethnicity,
or gender, respondents were quite mixed in their responses. Taken together, the evidence from disparity studies support a conclusion that
many MWBEs believe business discrimination exists. On the other
hand, the studies show most MWBEs do not perceive such discrimination. A widespread perception of contracting discrimination is cause
for concern, even if not all perceptions are accurate. The disparity
study reports, however, also do not support the blanket presumption
that all minority and women-owned businesses should be considered
socially disadvantaged in the certification process because they experienced discrimination.
VI. EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF MARYLAND MWBE CERTIFIED
FIRMS
When a firm owner signs the affidavit claiming “social disadvantage” in order to gain DBE or MWBE certification, what is that
person’s understanding of that concept? When the owner claims to
have suffered from discrimination, what kind of incidents does the
owner have in mind? Those questions have not been previously studied. Are those concepts and incidents consistent with the standard of
narrow tailoring on which a race and gender-conscious contracting
program could be constitutionally based? Maryland uses the Uniform
Certification process,175 so the process to become a certified DBE for
federal contracts and for state MWBE contract is the same. Does the
certification process affidavit clearly weed out owners entitled to some
remedy from those who are not? A survey of certified Maryland
MWBEs provides very preliminary answers to these questions.
In a February 2011 NERA statewide disparity study conducted
for the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”), 46.7% of
minority respondents and 69.1% of white women respondents did not
claim they had encountered discrimination in their business dealings.176 The survey included certified and uncertified firms, and the results are generally consistent with the pattern NERA found in its studies nationwide.
175

MD. CODE REGS. 11.01.10.01 (2012).
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE STATE OF MINORITY- AND
WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: EVIDENCE FROM MARYLAND 491 (2011).
176
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So what would be found if only certified Maryland MWBE
firms were asked about their concept of social disadvantage and their
experiences of discrimination? In June 2011, Maryland had certified
5,303 DBEs and MWBEs.177 From that list, twenty firms were chosen
for a telephone survey by using a systematic sample. Some owners
could not be reached at all, and sometimes the person filling out the
certification affidavit was not available. In those instances, the next
tenth firm on the certification list was used as a replacement to maintain the quality of the survey. In the end, of the twenty firms surveyed,
twelve were African American, three were Hispanic American, one
was an Asian American, and four were “non-minority” females.
Respondents gave a variety of answers about why they were
socially disadvantaged:
 I don’t have equal share of the contracts that are being
awarded by the government.
 Not being able to achieve or get what you want because of your sex.
 Not getting what you deserve or want due to certain
reasons having to do with your race.
Being denied things because of your social conditions,
race or sex.
 Not having access to the same opportunity.
 Not getting an equal share or opportunity to bid for
contracts.
 Being a minority, and having low income.
 Not having equal share of government contracts.
 Being confronted with the perception that people of
your race cannot perform in the business world.
177

Theodore Ogune & George La Noue, A Survey of Maryland MWBE Certified Firms (December 16, 2012) (unpublished study) (on filed with the author). This
particular section of research was conducted by Theodore Ogune, a lawyer and doctoral student in Public Policy at UMBC.
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 Not being treated fairly by the government because
you are African-American.
 Being deprived of rights and opportunities.
 The stereotype someone has to live within the business world because of race.
 Being discriminated against in the business world,
where your business is put aside or ignored because of
your race.
 Being denied things that should be free and equal for
all.
 Being a woman and being Black in this world.
 Not receiving equal treatment and benefits from the
government.
 The advantages from which you are naturally ruled
out because of your race.
When asked in follow-up questions about particular experiences of past discrimination, sixteen, or 80%, reported having individual
experiences of past discrimination in the business world at some point
in their life. When asked to describe specific incidents of this discrimination, however, many examples appeared to be generalized assertions
of “societal discrimination.”
For example, respondents reported:
 “I don’t have specifics, but we can always see that a
lot of contracts from the county and state go to the large
companies that are usually run by the white corporate
world. So being black and a female always put me in
the back seat.”
“I have a white friend who basically would not be
searched when we went out together, but I would usually be searched to the fullest.”
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“I have no specific examples but I have filed a complaint about discrimination in the past.”
“I have faced racism on several occasions in business
but I could not prove it.”
“I applied for a job in the past and did not receive it
because of my race. I believed it was because of race
because the person that I found out later got the job was
white and was not more qualified than me.”
“I won’t even speak of the horrifying experiences, but
what I would say is that I have experienced racism in
the country, and racism is still in full force depending
on where you find yourself.”
“I interviewed for a job that I believe I did not get because of my race.”
“At a restaurant in Texas when I went for a trip, the
white waiter was rude and very obnoxious towards me,
when I asked him the reason for his behavior he called
me a derogatory name.”
Only two of the illustrations of discrimination were related to
specific contracting occurrences.
 “I once applied for a contract and, for reasons that I
could not understand, did not get the contract, even
though I had the same qualifications as the one who received the contract.”
 “Back in 2004, I applied for a contract with the government along with my Caucasian friend, but, for some
reason, she received the contract before I was even considered, and I was generally better than her credentialwise. That left me to believe I was discriminated
against at least in that situation.”
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Not surprisingly, the certified MWBEs in this Maryland survey
had a variety of interpretations of the meaning of social disadvantage
and of the concept of discrimination itself.
According to contemporary judicial standards, a few of their
reports of discriminatory incidents might call for contracting remedies,
but most others focused on employment or other forms of discrimination for which an MWBE goals program is not a narrowly-tailored
remedy. Still other examples appear to be in the category of societal
discrimination which courts have ruled out as a compelling interest for
a remedial program.
A sample of twenty Maryland MWBEs cannot prove anything
about flaws in the certification process, but it is enough to establish a
hypothesis that the social disadvantage prong of that process is not
narrowly tailored.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court’s Croson decision converted the process of justifying preferential contracting programs from a matter of ideological
conviction or stereotypes to a matter of empirical proof. As Justice
O’Connor said, “proper findings” have to be made to “assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial
and economic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the
service of the goal of equality itself.”178
The DBE and MWBE certification processes begin by presuming that all minority and women business owners are socially and economically disadvantaged. Access to the business records used in the
economic disadvantage section of the certification process, particularly
those used to establish the applicant’s assertion about his or her comparative disadvantage with competitor firms, could permit a third party
to rebut that assertion. There is no meaningful way, however, to rebut
this presumption regarding particular applicants. Surely there is still
some discrimination in public procurement and some male majorityowned prime-contractors may choose to contract with sub-contractors
who look like them or belong to the same social clubs, even if other
sub-contractors offer lower prices or are more qualified. But that is a
long way from assuming such discriminatory behavior affects all minority and women-owned businesses, is perpetrated by all majority

178

opinion).

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality
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primes or that all MWBEs and DBEs are permanently damaged because of some past discriminatory incident.
The major reason for the current certification process is probably administrative convenience. The social disadvantage affidavit’s
use of terms such as racial prejudice and cultural bias to justify contracting preferences are not narrowly tailored according to Croson.179
For the bureaucrats that administer the certification process, however,
the affidavit process is enormously efficient. The affidavit is a single
sentence, and does not need to be verified.180 The economic disadvantage form, however, is ten pages, must be accompanied by supporting documents, and is sometimes carefully examined by certification
administrators.181
As Croson concluded, administrative convenience is not a sufficient reason to avoid narrowly-tailoring a preferential contracting
program.182 The Court rejected Richmond’s “interest in avoiding the
bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who truly have suffered the effects of prior discrimination.”183
Nevertheless, administrative convenience has dominated both
the conceptual characteristics and the application procedures of the
DBE and MWBE certification process. The list of minority groups under the presumption of disadvantage, and the definitions of social and
economic disadvantage, were borrowed by other government agencies
from the SBA and codified in the 1978 Small Business Investment Act
(“SBIA”).184 Despite the fact that the SBIA was passed many years before Croson, Adarand, and other court decisions set new standards for
race conscious remedies, these 1970s SBA concepts have never been
bureaucratically reviewed to examine their contemporary legality.
Key phrases such as “racial prejudice” and “cultural bias,” as
the Ninth Circuit recognized, may reflect only a claim of “societal discrimination,”185 which is not a proper predicate for allocating govern179

See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012); Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
See 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012).
181
See id. The process of confirming the status of firms claiming economic
disadvantage includes an office visit and interviews with the principal officers of the
firms to review their career histories. If the firm is a corporation, an analysis of who
owns the stock is completed. Analysis of the bonding and financial capacity, equipment owned, licenses held, key personnel, and work history of the firm is required.
Id. § 26.83 (2012).
182
Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.
183
Id.
184
BEAN, supra note 33, at 102.
185
W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 1002
(9th Cir. 2005).
180
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ment contracts on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender.186 These
phrases are subject to a wide variety of personal interpretation. Furthermore, it is also flawed to certify a business because the owner has
expressed that “my ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same or similar line of business who are not
socially and economically disadvantaged.”187 Such an opinion may also reflect societal discrimination. It is not tied to any time or place, and
no proof is necessary. Creating race conscious remedies based on a
person’s generalized beliefs about the discriminatory workings of the
free enterprise system, capital, and credit markets without documentation of its effects on an individual is a judicially unprecedented predicate for a race conscious remedy.
The social disadvantage presumption eliminates individualized
consideration of the characteristics or experiences of particular applicants. In summarizing the debate about the use of the social disadvantage presumption, USDOT concluded, “This presumption (i.e., a
determination that it is not necessary for group members to prove individually that they have been the subject of discrimination or disadvantage) is based on the understanding of Members of Congress about
the discrimination that members of these groups have faced.”188 Even
if “understandings of Members of Congress” were a sufficient basis to
grant the presumption to whole groups,189 the certification process requires individual applicants to sign affidavits, under oath, that they
have suffered racial prejudice, cultural bias, or discrimination--societal
discrimination which is not a basis for a remedial contracting program,
and thus may not be narrowly tailored. Furthermore, Congressional
understandings would not be sufficient to support the use of this certification language by states, transit districts, sanitation districts, and
school systems.
186

Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
187
49 C.F.R. § 26 App. E (2012).
188
Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of
Transportation Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 5096, 5099 (Feb. 2, 1999). On the other hand,
Congress also determined that under the revised DBE program, each recipient would
have the obligation to determine locally set goals which would create a level playing
field and to maximize race neutral means to reach that goal, which is not consistent
with a view that Congress wanted to extend preferential contracting benefits to all
members of the bureaucratically designated racial, ethnic, and gender groups.
189
See Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 413 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (holding that a race preferential contracting must be based on specific preenactment evidence before Congress).
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USDOT cited no judicial decisions to support a group-based
presumption as a basis for racial preferences because of generalized
legislative beliefs. Such a concept was inconsistent with Croson then
and also with more recent Court decisions about racial classifications.190 Even when the Court has accepted the limited use of race in
allocating public benefits such as in college admissions, it has insisted
there be individualized decisions about the beneficiaries.191
How could the certification process become narrowly tailored?
The first step would be to eliminate the “racial prejudice” and “cultural
bias” language from the social disadvantage section of the application.
These are concepts that are both under inclusive and over inclusive.
Cultural bias in America is not exclusive to the designated minorities
or women. Such bias might affect white male persons who are homosexual, disabled, obese, smokers, or members of minority religions or
minority ethnic groups such as Arabs or Iranians. On the other hand, a
woman or member of the designated minority groups might have experienced cultural bias at some point in their lives, but have long since
overcome its effects. The fact that the certification applicant has held a
high political or governmental position, is on prominent business or
community boards, or is a graduate of an elite university is irrelevant
in the current certification process. Apparently, once born into the designated groups, no subsequent achievement can erase the presumption
of social disadvantage. There is no comparable assumption in other areas of anti-discrimination enforcement. Where employment or housing
is involved, for example, it is not enough to claim generalized preju-

190

See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
191
In Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court made the distinction between the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions process, which
the Court found used race unconstitutionally, 539 U.S. at 275, and its law school
admission process, because in the latter “each applicant is evaluated as an individual
and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of
his or her application.” 539 U.S. at 337. In major universities, such individualized
admission decisions may involve reviewing tens of thousands of applications annually. But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 (“But the fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”). Recipients of federal funds already have procedures for making individualized, social disadvantage evaluations of applicants by considering education, employment, and
business history, but they apply only to persons without the presumption. For persons with the presumption, the social disadvantage decision is based simply on their
racial, ethnic, and gender identification. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F (2012).
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dice or cultural bias--there must be some specific discriminatory incident involved.
Similarly, the language about “diminished ability to compete in
the free enterprise system” should be replaced with a request for evidence that the applicant has actually experienced economic discrimination that has continued to affect the competitiveness of their business.
For both the social and economic prongs, the certification process should require information which would allow narrowly-tailored
judgments to be reached about disadvantage. For instance, information
should be requested about when and where the alleged incidents occurred. Such information is not now required for those whose group
membership makes them presumptively disadvantaged, though it is required for those lacking that membership. However, experiences of
childhood discrimination 192 or bias may no longer be relevant to an
owner’s current business situation. While one state may not legally
use contracting preferences to remedy discrimination allocating state
dollars in its MWBE program to remedy discrimination in another
state,193 MWBE certification processes generally do not require that
any of the allegations of prejudice, bias or discrimination be confined
to that state. MWBE certification forms are usually based on Uniform
Certification forms which reflect the national DBE program.194 Information should also be gathered about what benefits the applicant has
already received. Many firms have been certified for decades and have
received preferential contracts during the whole period. Perpetual
multi-jurisdictional contracting preferences should not be allowable as
narrowly tailored remedies.
If the affidavit were limited to individually experienced discrimination, courts should refine the definitions or boundaries for certification. Croson ruled that societal discrimination is not a basis for a
remedial program because it has no “stopping point.”195 Since it is extremely unlikely that discrimination and cultural bias in some form
will end in the United States, there is no logical end to DBE and
MWBE programs either.
192

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (rejecting the idea that discrimination in primary and secondary schools justifies medical school admission quotas). The current
certification applications do not ask when an applicant feels he or she suffered from
racial prejudice, cultural bias or discrimination. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 26 App. F
(2012).
193
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
194
See, e.g. MD. CODE REGS. 11.01.10.01 (2012).
195
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S.
267, 275 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
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From Croson to all its many successor judicial decisions, courts have
not found DBE or MWBE programs to be abstractly unconstitutional.
They have, however, required them to have a compelling interest and
to be narrowly tailored in operation. They have examined carefully
many aspects of these programs, including the disparity studies and
other evidence, the duration of the programs, the groups and industries
covered, and the use of race neutral alternatives. However, the one
program facet they have not subjected to strict scrutiny is the certification process. Upon examination of the certification process, it is likely
that courts will require modification of the economic and social disadvantage affidavit so that it not only focuses on persons entitled to a
race or gender conscious remedy, but is also consistent with other racial and gender classification laws.

